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ABSTRACT 
Tamil Eelam: Inevitably a Dream? 




This thesis seeks to examine the compatibility between political demands associated with 
Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka over the 20th century and what the international community 
was prepared to grant. It does this by simultaneously examining the contiguous stories of 
Tamil nationalism in Sri Lanka and the right to self-determination more generally over the 
course of the 20th century and up until the early 21st century, when the Sri Lankan civil war 
ended. It divides the time period into 3 sections to simultaneously compare the evolution of 
Tamil nationalism and transformation of the right to self-determination. It concludes that the 
demands associated with Tamil nationalism have, throughout the 20th century and early 21st 
century, always been incompatible with what the West was prepared to give them.   
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Introduction 
 
The Sri Lankan civil war, which took place from 1983 to 2009, was the military 
confrontation between Tamil militant groups, primarily the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) demanding an independent state in the North East of the Island, (‘Tamil Eelam’) and 
the Sri Lankan state. In 1993, the leader of the LTTE, Vellupillai Prabhakaran stated at the 
annual ‘Heroes Day’ address “we are standing on a strong moral foundation. We are fighting 
for a just cause. Our political objectives conform with international norms and principles. Our 
people are eligible for the right to self-determination. They have the right to statehood. Under 
international law this right cannot be denied. We must be firm in the cause of our struggle 
because truth and justice are on our side. Only when people are firmly and resolutely 
committed to their cause can they win their freedom”1. This interpretation of their fight was 
in sharp contrast to the way that much of the international community perceived the civil war. 
The US, UK, The EU and Canada deemed the LTTE terrorists over the course of the 26 year 
war and emphasis was placed on condemning their tactics. Human rights organizations such 
as Human Rights Watch (HRW) would condemned the civilian casualties that had been 
caused by both sides to the war but were silent on the political issue that had given rise to the 
war. This thesis is motivated by the lack of clarity on the compatibility between what the 
LTTE were demanding on behalf of Tamil people in Sri Lanka and what the international 
community felt the Tamil community were eligible to receive when it came to the right to 
self-determination, as a minority community within a former colony.  
 
The LTTE’s call for an independent state, for the realization of the right to self-
determination, throughout the civil war was not an isolated phenomenon of Sri Lankan Tamil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Velupillai Prabhakaran, “Maha Veerar Naal Address, மாவீரர் நாள் 1993,” Tamil Nation, November 27, 1993, 
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nationalism and a strengthening in Tamil demands for better forms of representation can be 
traced from the early 20th century. When I say Tamil nationalism2, I am referring to the 
recognition of Sri Lankan Tamil people as a distinct community with a desire of preserving 
their culture and land through political representation. When nationalism is defined this way, 
it seems that Tamil people have always been nationalist. Over time however nationalism has 
acquired a political character, it has transformed from being a self-evident assumption of the 
existence of a community to a demand for the existence of a separate community in Sri 
Lanka. Thus the demands associated with Tamil nationalism, driven by the desire to preserve 
a collective identity, have strengthened over time, from increased representation in 
government to a federal government to, finally, arriving at a separate state based on the right 
to self-determination. Tamil nationalist sentiments however should not be confused with 
Tamil demands for self-determination. I define self-determination within the context of Tamil 
nationalism as the desire for Tamil people to be governed by Tamil representatives. The 
desire for self-determination entered the timeline of Tamil nationalism after the adoption of 
the Soulbury Constitution in 1948 when Ceylon was granted independence. This was the 
moment when the Tamil community decided that it was not in their interest to be governed 
by a Sinhalese majority government and the demand for a federal government entered 
political discourse. 
 
It was also during this time that the concept of self-determination entered political discourse 
as a right through the statements and writings of Lenin and Wilson in the early twentieth 
century. By the 1960s it had entered international law as a right that all colonial states 
possessed and it’s withholding gained the status of jus cogens. Jus cogens is a peremptory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I will use the term ‘Tamil nationalism’ in this thesis to refer only to Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism. It does not refer to 
Indian Tamil nationalism. Additionally, when I refer to a Tamil community I am referring only to ‘Ceylon Tamils’ living 
primarily in the North and East of the island and not ‘Indian Tamils’. The relationship between these two communities is an 
interesting topic to explore but beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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status attributed to the prohibition of certain crimes and “enjoys a higher rank in the 
international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’ customary rules”3. The right to 
self-determination also became the only human right to be featured in both human rights 
covenants in 1966. However, despite the apparent legal strength of the right to self-
determination, the LTTE’s demand for the right was deemed illegitimate. Through this thesis, 
I do not just want to look at why the LTTE’s claims to self-determination were not supported 
by the international community from 1983 to 2009. I am interested in the history of political 
claims associated with Tamil nationalism over the course of the 20th century and how they 
corresponded to what the international community felt a minority community of a colony and 
later former colony could have in terms of political power. The fact that the international 
order has often been determined by a few Western states is not an uncontroversial statement 
and the power to grant what Tamil people in Sri Lanka have wanted over the course of the 
20th century has often lay at the discretion of other people. Thus for my project it is important 
to look at how the right to self-determination has been perceived by those in power.  
 
My goal through the investigation that follows is to answer the question of whether the 
demands associated with Tamil nationalism over the 20th century has ever coincided with 
what the international community was prepared to give them. In order to do tackle this 
question I will need to tell two separate stories, the first is of self-determination and the way 
it has been perceived by global powers and the second is the story of Tamil nationalism, 
which I will outline in a truncated form due to spatial limitations. It is likely that these two 
stories are interconnected, as it may be that Tamil people mobilized the language of self-
determination as promoted by the international community to advance their goals but for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ICTY, Judgment of The Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija (IT-95-17/1) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia December 10, 1998). Para 153. For more information on the jus cogens nature of self-determination see pgs. 
169-174 in Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Reprinted, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial 
Lectures 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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purpose of my current project I will artificially separate the two stories. As expected it is 
difficult to ascertain exactly what every member of the Tamil community wanted at different 
times, but for my current project I will assume that election results and the messages 
communicated by political representatives are accurate indications of what Tamil people 
wanted. The thesis that follows will be structured in 3 sections that examine these two stories 
in parallel by dividing the 20th century (and early 21st century as my enquiry is limited by the 
end of Sri Lankan civil war) into 3 time periods that correspond to important shifts in the 
global order. The first is the early 20th century up until the end of the World War II. The 
second section starts at the beginning of a new world order that was created with the 
establishment of the United Nations and the final section looks at the post Cold War era. I 
will conclude that the demands associated with Tamil nationalism have, throughout the 20th 
century and early 21st century, always been incompatible with what the West was prepared to 
give them. 
Section 1: The first half of the 20th century 
1.1 The story of self-determination: Wilson & Lenin.  
 
The end of World War I saw groundbreaking conceptions of self-determination that were 
vastly different from previous conceptions. Two key figures that pioneered the concept of 
self-determination were American President Woodrow Wilson and Russian revolutionary, 
Vladimir Lenin. They both championed aspirational visions of self-determination that 
transformed the right into as a positive rather than negative international right that imposed 
obligations on third party states. States had a duty to help nations who wished to realize the 
right to self-determination rather than simply not interfering in foreign states that already 
possessed the right. The characteristics of their conceptions served their own political visions 
and despite both conceptions recognizing ethnic nations’ right to self-determination it was 
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only Lenin’s conception that extended to the Third World by applying to countries under 
European colonial rule such as Ceylon. For Wilson, sovereignty still presupposed 
civilization. Their aspirational conceptions however differed significantly from the reality of 
state recognition during this period of time. 
 
Woodrow Wilson’s vision of a post war world order, which led to the creation of the League 
of Nations in 1920, was based on the concept of international peace and justice. Self-
determination featured prominently in this vision and Anthony Whelan has identified 3 key 
characteristics of his conception4. The first was the dependence of legitimacy of rule on the 
consent of the governed, the second was that self-determination entailed sovereignty, and 
finally, it gave weight to ethnic nationalism. These characteristics were all visible in a variety 
of speeches given by Wilson towards the end of and after the war. In his “Peace without 
Victory” speech in 1917, thought of as his first articulation of the post war order, Wilson 
argued for the “principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the 
governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to 
sovereignty”5. Wilson’s address to Congress in 1919 showed that he believed nations had the 
right to self-determination: “National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be 
dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere 
phrase. It is an imperative principle of actions which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their 
peril.”6 I will add a final component to Wilson’s conception of self-determination and that is 
that it entailed the right to a democratic government7. I refer to the procedural aspect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Anthony Whelan, “Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement,” The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 43, no. 1 (January 1994): 99–115, https://doi.org/10.1093/iclqaj/43.1.99. 
5 Woodrow Wilson, “A World League for Peace” (Address to the Senate of the United States, United States Senate, January 
22, 1917), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65396. 
6 Woodrow Wilson, “Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances” (President Wilson’s Address to Congress, United 
States Congress, February 11, 1918), http://www.gwpda.org/1918/wilpeace.html. 
7 Anthony Whelan acknowledges this in his article: “President Wilson actually preferred the phrase “self-government” 
which implied their right to select their own democratic government”. Whelan, “Wilsonian Self-Determination and the 
Versailles Settlement.” 100. 
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democracy here - Wilson, along with other participants at the Paris Peace conference, felt that 
the right to self-determination applied to the majority of a set population and that consent of 
the governed could be obtained with a majority vote8. 
 
Lenin proposed a similar conception of the right to self-determination before, during and 
after WWI, in terms of scope and eligibility (aspirations were enough to make a nation 
eligible to the right) however with a very different vision of the post war order. For Lenin, 
recognition of the right to self-determination was a necessary step in the creation of “a united 
world proletariat”9. He recognized ethnic groups as a nation but for him, the groups that 
where entitled to self-determination were not simply ethnic nations but the working class 
within these nations. This was evident in his writing in 1903 when he wrote, “unconditional 
recognition of the struggle for the freedom of self-determination in no way obligates us to 
support each demand for national self determination. Social democracy, as the party of the 
proletariat, has as a positive and major task the achievement of self-determination not of 
peoples and nations, but of the proletariat within each nationality.”10 His 1915 essay titled 
The Question of Peace makes it abundantly clear that he intended the right to apply to 
oppressed nations, “A socialist of any of the oppressor nations (Britain. France, Germany, 
Japan, Russia, the United States of America, etc.) who does not recognise and does not 
struggle for the right of oppressed nations to self-determination (i.e., the right to secession) is 
in reality a chauvinist, not a socialist.”11 He also connected colonialism to oppression and 
Antonio Cassese has characterized Lenin’s self-determination as an “anti-colonial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This is supported by the use of plebiscites to resolve border disputes with the creation of Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Yugoslavia after the end of WWI. See Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of 
New States since 1776 (Oxford  ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 129. 
9 Stanley W. Page, “Lenin and Self-Determination,” The Slavonic and East European Review 28, no. 71 (1950): 342–58. 
351. 
10 Vladimir Lenin, “The National Question in Our Programme,” Iskra, July 15, 1903, Marxists Internet Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1903/jul/15.htm. 
11 Vladimir Lenin, “The Question of Peace,” Prolelorshaya Revolulsia, 1921, Marxists Internet Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1915/jul/x02.htm. 
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postulate”12. A letter to Lenin by the Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin explicitly stated “Our 
international programme must bring all oppressed colonial peoples into the international 
scheme. The right of all peoples to secession or to home rule must be recognized…The 
novelty of our plan must be that the Negro and all other colonial peoples participate on an 
equal footing with European peoples in the conferences and commissions and have the right 
to prevent interference in their internal affairs.”13 This quote also makes clear that, like 
Wilson, Lenin’s conception of self-determination entailed sovereignty14. 
 
These conceptions of self-determination were radically different from previous practice when 
it came to state recognition, which depended on de facto attainment of statehood15. Of state 
recognition in the 19th century, Mikulas Fabry writes, “the right to self-determination applied 
to any self-defined people and outsiders were required to do no more than to recognize the de 
facto attainment of what was presumed to be their will.”16 In stark contrast the conception of 
self-determination put forward by Wilson and Lenin “did not demand for respect for self-
attained outcomes but for “wishes” and “aspirations”.”17 It also imposed duties and 
obligations on third parties. It had all the qualities of a contemporary human right, which 
oblige state parties to international treaties to respect, protect and fulfill the rights covered in 
them.  
 
In reality, acknowledgement of new states in the aftermath of World War I up until the end of 
World War II followed a similar pattern to the previous century. It required recognition by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. 16. 
13 Vladimir Ilich Lenin, On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State (Moscow, 1968). 421. 
14 Vladimir Lenin, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” Prosveshcheniye, no. 4,5,6 (June 1914), 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm#ch01. Lenin stated that “if we want to grasp the 
meaning of self-determination of nations, not by juggling with legal definitions, or “inventing” abstract definitions, but by 
examining the historico-economic conditions of the national movements, we must inevitably reach the conclusion that the 
self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of 
an independent national state.” 
15 Fabry, Recognizing States. Fabry examines the ways states were recognized prior to the 20th century in Chapters 1-3. 
16 Fabry. 117. 
17 Fabry. 120. 
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the great powers of the day and these powers chose to recognize states that had achieved de 
facto independence, “even if none of them could establish independence when they did 
without the military defeat of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires.”18 The 
US administration’s actions did not mirror Wilson’s universalistic and sweeping language on 
the right to self-determination. It was clear that the US administration viewed Wilson’s 
conception of self-determination as flawed and wanted to proceed with caution with 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing warning President Wilson “to go very slowly before we 
take a step which commits this government to the recognition of an independent state based 
upon the principle that a people who have been oppressed and their native land held in 
subjection by superior force are entitled to be free and to possess the land” in his 
Memorandum on the Recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks as a Nationality19.  
 
Considerations relating to the ethnic, religious, linguistic, historic and other characteristics of 
a territory’s inhabitants did enter debates relating to the drawing of borders in new states, but 
this was only after these new states had been deemed legitimate according to the standard de 
facto criteria. Even at this stage, despite the fact that “the major allies of the United States in 
Europe, Britain, Russia, France and Italy, officially espoused self-determination too”20 
primacy was not given to Wilson’s conception of self-determination and Fabry has noted that 
“the lack of any transparent hierarchy among the criteria determining territorial delimitations 
– that is some a priori conception of how to balance self-determination with economic, 
geographical, historical, or strategic factors – encouraged maximal demands, discouraged 
compromise, and led inevitably to perceptions of inconsistencies across cases.”21 Another key 
reason for the limited application of Wilson’s principle of self-determination was the lack of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Fabry. 118. 
19 United States Department of State, “Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Lansing Papers, 
1914-1920.” II (1920 1914), http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS19141920v2&isize=M. 139. Also see Fabry, Recognizing States. 123.  
20 Fabry, Recognizing States. 121.  
21 Fabry. 129. 
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clarification he gave to the actual application of the concept. There is little indication that 
Wilson grappled with the challenges that his idea of self-determination posed such as which 
groups of people qualified for the right, what obligations third parties had and how the right 
to self-determination was to be achieved if a group was deemed to qualify. The magnitude of 
demands for the right that his words resulted in led to Wilson admitting in 1919 that “when I 
gave utterance to those words [‘that all nations had a right to self-determination’], I said them 
without the knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day… You 
do not know and cannot appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as a result of many 
millions of people having their hopes raised by what I have said.”22 
 
Additionally, whilst self-determination was introduced into international considerations when 
it came to setting boundaries of new territories, self-determination was not seen as something 
that minorities, or numerically inferior groups within a population were eligible to. Secession 
was not an option and the Commission of Jurists and Commission of Rapporteurs made this 
clear in the Åland Islands dispute in which the Swedish speaking population of the Aland 
Islands demanded self-determination through secession from Finland. They stated that “to 
concede to minorities either of language or of religion, or to any fractions of the population, 
the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or 
their pleasure, would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a 
territorial entity.”23 The simultaneous denial of sovereignty but granting of significant 
autonomy to the region due to the recognition of a distinct Åland Islands population suggests 
a lack of clarity in the conception of self-determination at this time. Unlike Wilson and 
Lenin’s conceptions it is not clear that self-determination necessarily entailed secession and 
sovereignty. To add further confusion the commissioners, in a seeming contradiction, also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Quoted in Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. 22. fn 33. 
23 The Aaland Islands Question, “Report Presented to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of 
Rapporteurs,” April 16, 1921. 4. 
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agreed that an abuse or failure of sovereign power might as a last resort justify secession 
“when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective 
guarantees of religious, linguistic and social freedom.”24  
 
In addition to self-determination of nations, Wilson’s vision of a post-war world included 
minority provisions. Whilst Wilson did not provide much clarification on which ‘peoples’ 
where entitled to self-determination, his emphasis on minority provisions shows an 
awareness that for new states, “depending on where the dividing line is drawn, an ethnic, 
religious or other community aspiring to nationhood can become either a “people entitled to 
full self-government, or a minority, with only minimal rights accorded to members of what 
was, in the Versailles scheme, a residual category”.25 Minority protections were not included 
in the League Covenant26 but were included in various peace treaties, which obliged defeated 
and new states to protect all inhabitants “without distinction of birth, nationality, language, 
race or religion”27. The inclusion of these provisions also shows the paternalistic nature of the 
granting of sovereignty by ‘great powers’, as obligations towards minorities were seen as 
signs of a ‘civilized’ state. When Wilson suggested the inclusion of minority provisions in the 
German Treaty, British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George suggested that “international 
obligations” be imposed upon all the new states to bring them up to the standards of “other 
civilized countries”. During the post war period, a condition of sovereignty for states that had 
passed the de facto criteria was protection of minorities28. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The Aaland Islands Question. 28. 
25 Whelan, “Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement.” 103. 
26 The US, UK and other imperial supporters were opposed to the universal application of minority protections when 
Japanese delegate, Baron Makino suggested it during the drafting. See Carole Fink, “The League of Nations and the 
Minorities Question,” World Affairs 157, no. 4 (1995): 197–205.  
27 League of Nations, “Polish Minority Treaty” (1919), http://ungarisches-institut.de/dokumente/pdf/19190628-3.pdf. 
28 This was seen again in the granting of independence for Iraq in 1931when the Permanent Mandates Commission asked for 
guarantees relating to the protection of minorities. See Fabry, Recognizing States. 151. 
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Interestingly, the US’s attitudes towards Czechoslovakia show that the US was not opposed 
to the use of force in liberation movements. When recognizing the belligerency of 
Czechoslovakia, Lansing acknowledged “If they succeed in their revolt and are associated 
with the United States and Entente in a military victory, they will have established by force of 
arms, their sovereign right to self-rule and independence”. Additionally the US explicitly 
stated that it was “prepared to enter formally into relations with the de facto government thus 
recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemies, the empires 
of Germany and Austria- Hungary”29. This recognition of the legitimacy of a liberation 
movement and acknowledgement of it as a de facto state is significant for my current project. 
 
It is important to acknowledge, for my present enquiry, that it was the case that the self-
determination accepted by European powers was limited to apply only to states within 
Europe and did not extend to European colonies. Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
endorsed Wilson’s principle of self-determination in a 1918 speech stating that “government 
with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war” 
however this principle was limited only for “the future of European civilization”30. The 
mandate system within the League of Nations, which transferred the colonies and territories 
of defeated states to new states, also made it clear that sovereignty still presupposed 
civilization during the post World War I period. Article 22 of the League covenant justified 
the transfer of sovereignty by claiming that the territories were “inhabited by peoples not yet 
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”31.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Fabry. 124. 
30 David Lloyd George, “British War Aims” (Caxton Hall, London, January 5, 1918), 
https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Prime_Minister_Lloyd_George_on_the_British_War_Aims. 
31 League of Nations, “Covenant of the League of Nations” (1919), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html. Article 
22. 
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1.2 The story of Tamil nationalism: The move from communal to territorial 
representation. 
 
Following Britain’s conquest of Ceylon in 1815, a highly centralized government was put in 
place through the Colebrook Constitution in 1833. A legislative council and executive 
council was introduced and whilst there were no elections for any of the positions, members 
of key communities were nominated to become unofficial members of the legislative council 
and represent the views of their community. Initially there were representatives from the 
European, Sinhalese, Celyon Tamil and Burgher communities. In 1889, representatives for 
the Muslim and Kandyan Sinhalese communities were added. Thus a communal form of 
representation was introduced on the island and for the first time Ceylonese people from 
some communities had a very limited voice in the administration. These members of the 
legislative council had no right to initiate legislation and could only contribute to discussion.  
 
The reason for this communal form of representation is most likely because of the geographic 
separation of the diverse communities the island was home to, which had led to pockets of 
communities with incredibly varied cultures. Tamil and Sinhala populations lived in 
relatively isolated locations, the Tamils in the North and the East and the Sinhala population 
in the South. The British later brought 1 million Indian Tamils from India as cheap labour for 
tea estates in Kandy, in the central provinces of Sri Lanka. (This doubled the Tamil speaking 
population from 1 to 2 million). What is important to note here is that despite the Ceylon 
Tamils constituting 12.86% of the total Ceylonese population and the Sinhalese counting for 
66.13% of the total population in 191132, they had the same number of representatives in 
government. This along with the fact that prior to Britain’s conquest of the island, previous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Department of Census & Statistics, Sri Lanka, “Table 2.10: Population by Ethnic Group and Census Years,” Wayback 
Machine, August 8, 2014, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140808035544/http://www.statistics.gov.lk/Abstract%202013/CHAP2/2.10.pdf. 
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colonial powers had administered the Tamil territory separately from the rest of the county 
led to “the perception that each of them were the island’s ‘founding races’, the major 
communities, while the others (Muslim, Indian and Burghers) were the minorities33. 
 
Political representation for Tamils during British rule, up until the early twentieth century, 
however did not come from the North or East but from Colombo, in particular individuals 
within the Ramanathan- Arunachalam family who resided in the illustrious Cinnamon 
Gardens estate, also known as Colombo 7. Cultural segregation did not exist between the 
middle classes of each community, who held jobs in the public service and resided together 
in the capital. There was little opposition to the fact that Tamil politics was dominated by the 
English educated elite in the capital, despite the majority of the community living in the 
North Eastern regions of the island because “a notion prevailed that among the Ceylon 
Tamils that the pre-eminence of Coomaraswamy34 and his successors together with the 
recognition that they received from their colonial patrons, redounded to the credit of the 
community as a whole. This pattern of political behavior persisted until the 1920s.”35 
 
K.M De Silva, a prominent Sri Lankan historian has written of politics in the early twentieth 
century “What distinguished elite politics in Ceylon in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century from succeeding decades was the harmony that prevailed between the Sinhalese and 
Tamil leadership.”36 In the early late nineteenth century and early twentieth century the 
brothers, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan and Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, dominated 
Tamil politics. Ponnambalam Ramanathan was nominated to be the unofficial Tamil member 
from 1879 to 1892 and his brother Arunachalam was nominated to be an official member of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000). 42. 
34 Wilson is referring to Arumuganathapillai Coomaraswamy who was the earliest known member of the Ramanathan-
Arunachalam family and was an unofficial member of the Legislative Council from 1833-1836.  
35 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism. 45. 
36 K. M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (London  : Berkeley: C. Hurst  ; University of California Press, 1981). 387. 
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the Legislative Council from 1906 to 1912. It is difficult to categorize the brothers as ‘Tamil 
nationalists’, for much of their careers Wilson writes that they “both clamored for increased 
self-government without enunciating any distinct goals or objectives for the protection of 
Tamils”37. It would be more apt to describe them, especially Ramanathan, as Ceylonese 
nationalists. They were well respected by both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities and 
when limited franchise was introduced to the legislative council in 191038, Ramanathan was 
elected as the educated Ceylonese member twice (despite running against Sinhalese 
candidates). In 1915, following the anti-Muslim riots between Sinhalese Buddhists and 
Ceylon Moors, he condemned the harsh punishment imposed by the British39 in the 
legislative council “and antagonized the minority community next in size to the Ceylon 
Tamils, the Tamil-speaking Ceylon Muslims”40. Arunachalam was a key proponent of 
constitutional reform as founding president of the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) in 1919. 
This national political party, which initially comprised of members from the Tamil and 
Sinhala communities, was instrumental in the push for increased self-government from the 
early 20th century up until independence in 1948.  
 
Thus Tamil nationalism up until the 1920s constituted what A.J Wilson calls a “Tamil 
national awareness”41, where the Tamil community maintained their separateness from the 
Sinhalese and other groups on the island. They did not think of themselves as a minority and 
“looked on themselves as one of the two “founding races” of the island”42. They were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism. 68. 
38 The Crew McCallum Reforms of 1910 added four elected unofficial members to the Legislative Council. Two were 
Europeans; one was Burgher and one educated Ceylonese. 
39 De Silva has written of Ramanathan’s response to the riots: “In the Legislative Council Ponnambalam Ramanathan, with 
all the moral authority of the elected representative of the educated Sri Lankans, rose to the defence of the Sinhalese leaders 
in a series of impassioned speeches notable alike for their fearless condemnation of the excesses committed by the British 
forces in suppressing the riots, and the cogently argued refutation of the conspiracy theory”. De Silva, A History of Sri 
Lanka. 378. 
40 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1988). 57. 
41 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism. 3. 
42 Wilson. 48. 
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satisfied with being represented by the anglicized elite in Colombo because of the respect 
given to Ramanathan and Arunachalam by the British because “an honor conferred by it on 
one Tamil in those days meant prestige for the whole community”43. From the 1920s onwards 
there was an increased demand for self-government by all Ceylonese people and it is at this 
point when there was a clear divergence in priorities between Tamil and Sinhalese 
communities. Territorial representation is often associated with self-government and 
democracy and its introduction into the legislative council in 192044 resulted in conflicting 
objectives between the numerical minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese. K.M de Silva 
notes the breaking up of the harmony between the two communities at this time: “The 
situation changed fundamentally after 1922 when instead of two majority communities and 
the minorities; there was one majority community – the Sinhalese – the Tamils now 
regarding themselves as a minority community. It has remained so ever since.”45  
 
De Silva was however mistaken when he wrote this observation because, as is clear from 
subsequent demands by Tamil politicians, Tamils did not regard themselves as a minority 
community despite having minority status thrust upon them by the introduction of territorial 
representation. This was abundantly clear in 1918 when the Jaffna Association46 stated that 
“under any system of election, territorial or communal, the existing proportion of Tamil 
representatives to Sinhalese representatives should, as far as possible be maintained”47. For a 
short amount of time it seemed like Sinhalese leaders in the CNC were supportive of this 
request, however their refusal to allocate a previously agreed special seat in the Western 
Province for Tamils led to a break in Arunachalam’s relationship with Sinhalese leaders in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Wilson. 52. 
44 The Legislative Council underwent reforms, known as the Manning Devonshire Reforms, once again in 1920 and 1923 
and that included increases in the number of unofficial members where many of these members were elected on a territorial 
basis. 
45 De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka. 387. 
46 Arunachalam Sabapathy, a Tamil unofficial member of the Legislative Council, founded the Jaffna Association in 1906 to 
represent the political interests of Tamils in Jaffna. 
47 Quoted in Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka. 63. 
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the CNC such as James Peiris and E.J Samarawarawickrema. He left the CNC in 1921 as a 
result. Wilson attributes the breakdown of consociational politics to the fact that “the 
Sinhalese majority was determined not to sacrifice the numerical advantage that territorial 
representation would give them”48. 
 
The Donoughmore Commission was appointed in 1927 to review the case for constitutional 
reform and there was a vacuum in Tamil leadership during this crucial time. Arunachalam 
had died in 1924 and Ramanathan had retired from politics in 1920. The Commission, De 
Silva writes “had the effect of exacerbating communal and political tensions on the island, 
with individuals and groups making exaggerated claims and demands in the hope of 
influencing the Commission’s work and the political constitutional structure it would 
recommend.”49 Despite these demands, the Donoughmore Report ended up recommending 
universal suffrage and made no provision for communal representation. De Silva writes on 
the aftermath of the report: “Representatives of minority opinion complained that while a 
significant measure of power had been transferred to Sri Lankans, safeguards for protecting 
the interests of minorities were surprisingly inadequate. Moreover the minorities found 
universal suffrage just as unpalatable as the Sinhalese, who took a stand against it50, and 
indeed even more so: for universal suffrage would result not only in the democratization of 
the electorates but it would guarantee the permanent Sinhalese domination of politics.”51 As 
will be discussed in more detail below, the Donoughmore Commission did not attach 
importance to minority concerns because their priority was fostering an all-Ceylon national 
unity and they viewed communal representation as an obstacle to this goal. In reference to 
communal representation they wrote in their report “it is our opinion that only by its abolition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Wilson. 59. 
49 De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka. 418. 
50 The leaders of the Ceylon National Congress were unhappy with limited extension of power to Ceylonese people and the 
extension of franchise to the Indian plantation workers. 
51 De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka. 423. 
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will it be possible for the diverse communities to develop together a true national unity”52. 
The Donoughmore Constitution was adopted in 1931 and Sri Lanka “became the first British 
colony in Asia- and indeed the first Asian country- to enjoy the principle of universal 
suffrage.”53 The Tamils had found themselves at this crucial moment without any clear leader 
to represent their interests and this was further exacerbated by the disastrous boycott of the 
State Council elections54 orchestrated by the Jaffna Youth Congress which left seats in Tamil 
regions vacant for almost 2 years.  
 
Ganapathipillai Gangaser Ponnambalam (GG Ponnambalam) became the unofficial leader of 
Ceylon Tamil politics shortly after the introduction of the Donoughmore constitution. He 
entered the State Council after being elected as the representative of the Point Pedro 
constituency (his home town) in 1934. He did not come from a reputable family like 
Arunachalam and Ramanathan and gained the support of Jaffna Tamils because of his ability 
“in the campaign arena and the State council to articulate the fears of the Ceylon Tamils and 
advocate the safeguards they needed”55. His most notable policy recommendation was ‘fifty-
fifty’ throughout the 1930s and 1940s, which demanded that half the seats in parliament to go 
to the Sinhalese majority and the other half to be distributed amongst the minority 
communities. He advocated for ‘fifty-fifty’, initially by himself in the State Council and then 
with the support of the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress to the Soulbury Commission. GG 
Ponnambalam and Samuel James Veluppillai (S.J.V) Chelvanayakam founded the All-
Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) in 1944 after the appointment of the Soulbury Commission 
and it was the first Tamil political party in Ceylon. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Great Britain and Richard Walter John Hely-Hutchinson Donoughmore, Report of the Special Commission on the 
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53 De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka. 422. 
54 The Donoughmore Constitution replaced the Legislative Council with the State Council as the legislature of British 
Ceylon. 
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What is important to note here is that from the 1930s up until the formation of the Soulbury 
Commission, Tamil “national awareness” had not yet transformed into a demand for self-
determination. GG Ponnambalam and ACTC were not asking that Tamils be governed by a 
Tamil government, they were requesting balanced representation within a unified Ceylon in 
line with Governor Manning’s 1922 recommendation that “no single community can impose 
its will upon other communities”56. In fact, Wilson in a footnote notes that, “In the early 
1930s, a memorandum for a federal constitution was submitted by a little-known Tamil from 
Jaffna; at that time the federal issue had not gained the support of Tamil opinion.”57 The 
language that GG Ponnambalam used to advocate for ‘fifty-fifty’ is filled with appeals to 
rights that groups were entitled to. For example, in a 1946 speech Ponnambalam is recorded 
as having stated “It is essential to place before the Tamils a policy and a program which will 
enable the Tamils to work for the common weal in cooperation with other communities in the 
island while conserving the inalienable rights of the community.”58 This language of 
“inalienable rights” makes it sound like he is appealing to human rights, however no human 
rights documents existed at the time. 
 
Despite having strong initial support for ‘fifty-fifty’ from most minority communities, the 
proposal ultimately failed due to lack of unity amongst the Tamil community and 
outmanoeuvring by D. S. Senanayake (who would later become the first prime minister of the 
newly independent Ceylon)59. A key strength of the proposal was the homogeneity, at the 
time, of the Board of Ministers – Ponnambalam used the fact that all the ministers were 
Sinhalese to show the danger that minorities faced under the existing form of representation. 
However Arunachalam Mahadeva, son of Ponnambalam Arunachalam and Member of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See Wilson. 7. 
57 Wilson. 83. 
58 Taken from The Hindu Organ, 5 February 1946. See Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism. 
59 See “Challenges to the Unitary State, I” in Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka. 
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State Council for Jaffna weakened this claim by joining the Board of Ministers in 1948. 
Whitehall viewed this appointment as proof “that the Sinhalese elites were willing to share 
power with their Tamil counterparts”60. When he came under attack for weakening the ‘fifty-
fifty’ proposal, Mahadeva is reported to have told his Tamil colleagues that it was “dead as 
the dodo”61. Whilst GG Ponnambalam was not able to bring about adequate protection for the 
Tamil community in the Soulbury Constitution of 1947, Wilson acknowledges Ponnambalam 
with raising “the national consciousness of the Ceylon Tamils. He was the first Ceylon Tamil 
in the British period of colonial rule to give his own people a sense of national awareness and 
persuade them that they should have a sense of patriotic pride”62.  
 
The Soulbury Constitution came into force in 1948, alongside Ceylon’s independence from 
colonial rule, and ACTC’s success in the 1947 general election (winning 7 of the 9 seats that 
they contested) caused them to conclude that, “The Tamil people of Ceylon have rejected the 
Soulbury Constitution in as much as at the general election, not one candidate of the U.N.P.63 
was elected to Parliament”64. On top of failing to include Ponnambalam’s ‘fifty-fifty’ 
suggestion the Soulbury Constitution contained few safeguards for minorities. The most 
significant minority protection was Section 29 (2)(b), which prohibited the existence of a law 
that “make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which 
persons of other communities or religions are not made liable”65. Shortly after independence, 
it became evident that the minority provisions were not enough to protect minority 
communities. In 1948 and 1949, Senanayake enacted legislation that deprived the Indian 
Tamil community of their citizenship. “At one stroke of the legislative pen, nearly half the 
Tamil population of the island (i.e. the Indian Tamils) lost all their seven seats in the House 	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61 Wilson. 65. 
62 Wilson. 75. 
63 The United National Party was D.S. Senanayake party that had been instrumental in leading the country to independence. 
64 Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka. 
65 “The Constitution of Ceylon,” February 1948, http://tamilnation.co/srilankalaws/46constitution.htm.  
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of Representatives”66. Interestingly, Wilson has suggested that one reason for the lack of 
minority provisions in the new constitution was that the “terms of reference of the Soulbury 
Commission did not envisage complete independence for Ceylon. There was still a modicum 
of power vested in the Governor, which could have been called upon in the event of a 
communal abuse of constitutional powers”. However, following the granting of independence 
to India, Pakistan and Burma in 1947 there was “no question of Ceylon remaining only partly 
self-governing”67. 
 
1.3 Conclusion: The incompatibility of communal representation and Britain’s liberal 
democracy. 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the story of self-determination was characterized by 
sweeping universal statements relating to the granting of the right to self-determination as 
sovereignty, which did not match the reality of the recognition of new states. Ethnic 
nationalism was one of many considerations in the granting of statehood in the post war era 
and the granting of sovereignty was denied to Third World countries that were still under the 
control of European colonial powers and deemed too uncivilized to enter the international 
community of sovereign states. Alongside this story we see a push for self-government in 
Ceylon led by the Ceylon National Congress (CNC), which Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam 
helped found in 1919. The story of Tamil nationalism during and after the founding of the 
CNC is distinct from the push for increased self-government in Ceylon; it is the story of the 
desire to maintain the status quo. By status quo, I do not mean colonial domination but rather 
political equality with the majority Sinhalese community, something Ceylon Tamils had had 
for centuries even before Britain’s conquest of the island. Whilst the British did not intend to 	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grant Ceylon the right to self-determination they were willing to extend to their colony 
increased self-government, first through the granting of limited franchise in 1920 and then 
through universal franchise in 1931. What is crucial for my analysis is that for British rulers, 
self-government in Ceylon necessarily meant the creation of a liberal democracy, which 
entailed the acceptance of majoritarian-territorial representation. What mattered in this 
system was numbers and the Sinhalese, as the numerical majority, were elevated above other 
communities to a position of power. 
 
Britain’s desire to supplant a model of liberal democracy in Ceylon is clear from the report of 
the Donoughmore Commission. The commissioners wanted Ceylon to become a “free, united 
and democratic nation”68. A key word to take note of is “united” – the commissioners were 
aware that a homogenous society, that behaved as one nation was necessary for the success of 
their model of liberal democracy and they also knew that Ceylon was composed of diverse 
distinct communities and saw this as an obstacle to their goal. In their report the 
commissioners state “These diverse elements and distinct classes, even if not antagonistic to 
each other, are in more or less separate compartments, this resulting in the lack of 
homogeneity and of corporate consciousness which make it difficult to achieve any national 
unity of purpose”. They acknowledged that the introduction of communal representation in 
1833 had been an “experiment” with the intention of developing democratic institutions and 
“was expected to provide, peacefully, an effective legislative assembly which would give a 
fair representation of the different elements in the population and would also tend to promote 
unity”69. The fact that it had maintained distinct communities was an unfortunate result and 
therefore made it an “obstacle” to their desired goal, thus its abolition was necessary along 
with the introduction of territorial representation. Their statements make it fair to conclude 	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that territorial representation was introduced to eliminate difference from political affairs70. 
The British had constructed a vision of who the ‘people’ of Ceylon were and this united 
group would be empty of sectarian and communal demands.  
 
However, it would be too generous to argue that the British were being naïve about the 
dangers that rule by majority posed to the island. The elite members of Ceylonese society 
who were pushing for increased self-government, through the CNC “showed little or no 
regard for the interests of the masses of the population”71 and the Commissioners were aware 
of this, writing in their report, “Democratic and electoral institutions are being accepted and 
even demanded, but the modern principle of political equality that goes with them has not yet 
been fully grasped.”72 The report also acknowledged the concerns that minority communities 
had about giving one community more power than another: “The minority communities are 
fearful that any preponderance of governmental power held by another community will 
inevitably be used against them and are keenly on the alert for signs of discrimination.”73 
Thus the British did not overlook the existence of difference and diversity; rather they felt 
that its appropriate place was in people’s private lives rather than entering the realm of 
politics. “The intrusion of diversity in politics, the commissioners argued, would have the 
unhappy consequence of making it impossible to arrive at anything like a common 
consensus.”74 
 
The “Tamil national awareness” that had existed up until the 1920s therefore strengthened as 
Ceylon was granted more political freedom and then later during the Soulbury Commission. 
This is because processes by which British rulers felt it most apt to introduce self-government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 David Scott, “Community, Number, and the Ethos of Democracy,” in Refashioning Futures: Criticism after 
Postcoloniality, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
71 Scott. 147. Use De Silva to show how CNC were not 
72 Great Britain and Donoughmore, Report of the Special Commission. 83. 
73 Great Britain and Donoughmore. 90-91. 
74 Scott, “Community, Number, and the Ethos of Democracy.” 169. 
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on the island threatened their status as political equals with the majority community on the 
island. This Tamil national awareness did not however progress into the demand for self-
determination by which I mean, as stated previously, the desire for Tamil people to be 
governed by Tamil representatives. GG Ponnambalam’s call for fifty-fifty representation was 
based on the idea of non-dominance within a unified Ceylon. What is crucial to the story of 
Tamil nationalism is that it was perceived as illiberal and “collaboration with the colonial 
government”75 to oppose universal suffrage and the reorganization of power that came with 
it. The numerical rationality inherent in the Donoughmore constitution was seen as 
progressive and more modern and there was an assumption that numbers was the most 
legitimate way to distribute power. Much influential historical analysis of this period does not 
question this assumption and promoted it76. Thus Tamil people were caught during this 
period in a ‘catch-22’ situation, they could reject the principle of democracy and be perceived 
as colonial collaborators or accept it and their position as a minority. They chose to accept 
the principle of democracy and as David Scott puts it, “swallowing the poison of the 
hegemonic story of democracy shackled Tamil nationalism”77. 
 
Section 2: 1948 – 1989 
2.1 The story of self-determination: Decolonization 
 
1945 marked to beginning of a period in the 20th century which is often labeled as 
‘decolonization’, African and Asian states gained independence from their colonial rulers at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Scott. 175. 
76 For example, De Silva writes of the equal status of Tamils and Sinhalese in the pre-Donoughmore period: “This state of 
affairs was too good to last. In democratic politics, which the political leadership of the island was pledged to uphold, 
numbers were inevitably a decisive factor. Soon numbers began to count, and when that happened, or was seen to be 
happening, the artificiality of the “two majority communities” concept was easily exposed”. K. M. De Silva, Managing 
Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880-1985 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986). 58-59. 
Jane Russell, a prominent British historian, has written of Ponnambalam’s fifty-fifty demands: “The Ceylon demands were 
in fact stimulated by a nostalgia for an era when their community had shared “majority” status with the Sinhalese. That era 
had passed, however, and could not be revived.” Jane Russell, Communal Politics Under the Donoughmore Constitution, 
1931-1947 (Dehiwala: Tisara Prakasakayo, 1982). 336. 
77 David Scott, In-person discussion, interview by Shibanee Sivanayagam, March 29, 2018. 
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an unprecedented rate. Seventy territories achieved independence between 1945 and 197978. 
The reasons behind the rapid granting of sovereignty to these states is up for debate but over 
the course of this period of decolonization there were significant changes to the 
characteristics of the right to self-determination. De facto statehood was no longer a pre-
requisite for the granting of statehood. The right to self-determination became synonymous 
with the granting of independence to colonial territories and peoples within non-self 
governing and trust territories, as determined by the UN Charter. It was also during this 
period that Third World states succeeded in transforming the right to self-determination from 
being a political ideal into a legally binding principle with jus cogens79 status in international 
law.  
 
Following the end of World War II in 1945, despite many colonies obtaining independence, 
such as Ceylon in 1948, there was no general acceptance of a right to self-determination, 
particularly from European and US political representatives. Clyde Eagleton, a legal advisor 
to the State Department and member of the US delegation at the United Nations Conference 
in San Francisco wrote in 1953 “self-determination… cannot be allowed to any group for the 
sole reason that the group chooses to claim it.”80 De facto statehood was still a prerequisite 
for obtaining independence81 and there was still a paternalistic attitude to the granting of 
sovereignty to colonies. Chapters XI82 and XII83 of The UN Charter, adopted in 1945, made it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Héctor Gros Espiell, “Implementation of United Nations Resolutions Relating to the Rights of Peoples under Colonial and 
Alien Domination to Self-Determination” (New York: UN Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, 1980), http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/353794. 
79 As stated in the introduction, jus cogens is a peremptory status attributed to the prohibition of certain crimes and enjoys a 
higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’ customary rules. See pgs. 169-174 in Cassese, 
Self-Determination of Peoples. 
80 Clyde Eagleton, “Excesses of Self-Determination,” Foreign Affairs, July 1, 1953, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1953-07-01/excesses-self-determination. 602. 
81 Fabry outlines how the granting of independence in Syria and Lebanon was dependent on effective statehood. See Fabry, 
Recognizing States. 155-156. 
82 Article 73 outlined that a goal of colonial states for their colonies was “to develop self-government, to take due account of 
the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, 
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement”. United 
Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” 1 UNTS XVI § (1945), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html. 
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clear that while self-government was a goal for non self-governing territories and territories 
under the Trusteeship, it was not something that many were yet ready for. Thus whilst a 
purpose of the United Nations was to “to develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other 
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”, self determination was not intended at 
this time to delegitimize decolonization or apply to all states. Of the inclusion of self-
determination in the UN Charter, international lawyer Antonio Cassese has written that the 
principle “was not considered to have a value independent of its use as an instrument of 
peace, it could easily be set aside when its fulfilment raised the possibility of conflicts 
between states… the Charter did not impose direct and immediate legal obligations on 
Members States. Its omission in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 
further illustrates this general sentiment amongst US and European powers.   
 
However, over the course of the next decade, Third World states that had recently obtained 
independence succeeded in making their conception of self-determination as an inalienable 
right to sovereignty a universal legally binding human right. Roland Burke has presented an 
interesting account of this period in which he argues that human rights concerns led to the 
delegitimising of colonialism84. He suggests that the recognition of self-determination, as 
envisaged by Third World states as a universal right to sovereignty, was triggered by a debate 
at the United Nations in the late 1940s in which “European delegations had demonstrated 
their intention to avoid any human rights promises to those outside the metropole by way of a 
special colonial exception clause in the draft human rights covenant”85. Debates relating to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Article 76 made it a goal of the Trusteeship System “to promote the political, economic, social, and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory”. United Nations. 
84 Roland Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). Through his book, Burke tries to argue that the Third World has had 
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this clause revealed that inhabitants of colonial territories would not have their human rights 
guaranteed to them. It was in the immediate aftermath of the rejection of this clause that the 
campaign for the inclusion of the right to self-determination in the human rights covenants 
was launched86 and in 1952 the UNGA Resolution on the right of peoples and nations to self-
determination recognized that it was “a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental 
human rights”87.  
 
The Final Communiqué of the 1955 Bandung conference, hailed as the first large-scale 
meeting of Asian and African states, outlined key characteristics of Third Worlds states’ 
attitudes to self-determination during the beginning of this period. Emphasis was placed on 
non-interference and state sovereignty and it was closely linked to the promotion of human 
rights; self-determination was described as a human right in itself and also a means by which 
human rights could be attained. Thus the conference gave self-determination both intrinsic 
and instrumental value – the communiqué declared both that “the subjection of peoples to 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human 
rights” and also that it “took note of the United Nations resolutions on the rights of peoples 
and nations to self-determination, which is a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all 
fundamental Human Rights”88. Debates in the UN General Assembly relating to self-
determination in the early 1950s revealed a sharp divide in opinion within Asian and African 
states over whether it should have instrumental or intrinsic value. By giving it instrumental 
value, the idea of self-determination entailed more than simply national independence and 
also included qualities of the internal political institutions within a state. Proponents of its 
intrinsic value however argued that political freedom and national sovereignty were distinct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The draft resolution on self-determination was formally presented on 9 November 1950. 
87 UN General Assembly, “The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination,” A/RES/637 § (1952), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0791c.html. 
88 Asian-African Conference, “Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung,” April 24, 1955, 
https://ecf.org.il/media_items/1128. 
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concepts and that self-determination “did not go into the question of the political system of a 
particular state”89. Ceylon’s delegate to the UN, Mahmud, fiercely advocated for this concept 
of sovereignty in 1954: “Before attaining complete independence, Ceylon had enjoyed great 
political freedom, and yet it had not been a sovereign nation, able to decide whether or not it 
wanted to be independent…. The right of peoples and nations to self-determination was 
simply their right to establish their own political institutions, to develop their economy and to 
direct their cultural and social evolution without any foreign intervention”90.  
 
The unanimous passing of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Persons (with 9 abstentions, all from the West91), greatly contributed to the 
right to self-determination for European colonial countries acquiring jus cogens status92. It 
gave primacy to the intrinsic value of self-determination and made no mention of the 
instrumental value of self-determination in its declaration that “the subjection of peoples to 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human 
rights” and that “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”93 Brian Simpson has concluded from rights based language within the 
declaration that “the program of the anti-colonial movement came to be expressed in the 
language of human rights”94. Effective statehood no longer was necessary for the granting of 
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sovereignty95; Third World states had successfully elevated self-determination to the status of 
a peremptory right that was framed in the “Western liberal idiom of human equality, dignity, 
and freedom”96. As the most important resolution dealing with the right to self-determination 
at the time, it dictated the scope of who was eligible to the right and resulted in a very narrow 
conception of which “peoples” were entitled to self-determination. The ‘peoples’ who were 
eligible for this right were Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories97. Interestingly, during 
this period, the international community including the Security Council believed liberation 
movements carried out by territories belonging to this category were legitimate and UN 
Resolutions passed in the 1970s98 codified the legitimacy of armed resistance to colonialism 
as well as foreign intervention in support thereof.  
 
In the decade following the adoption of the 1960 Declaration, there was a sharp move away 
from seeing self-determination as having any instrumental value for the attainment of 
individual human rights by Third World states and it became more and more confined to 
simply the granting of sovereignty and the protection of newly independent states’ territorial 
integrity. This was reflected through the adoption of Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and 
Sovereignty99 in 1965 and the language of the Declaration on Friendly Relations, adopted in 
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Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
96 Fabry, Recognizing States. 154. 
97 Despite some arguments to extend colonialism to cover the “communist imperialism” it was not explicitly referred to in 
the Declaration beyond the condemnation of colonialism in “all its forms and manifestations”. See Roland Burke, 
“‘Tranforming the End into the Means’: The Third World and the Right to Self-Determination,” in Decolonization and the 
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1970100 which stressed each state’s “inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social 
and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State” and that “nothing in 
the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States”101. 
 
Academics differ in their reasons for the vigor with which Third World states defended the 
principle of territorial integrity. Anghie had argued that it was to reverse and avoid further 
exploitation by Western powers whilst Fabry has argued “the uti possidetis of decolonization 
served to safeguard the new states also against internal fragmentation.”102 It seems fair to 
give both reasons some weight. What was extremely clear during this period was that 
minorities within former colonies did not qualify for the right to self-determination. 
Decolonization was accompanied by many internal conflicts because “the widespread 
rejection of colonial rule did not necessarily translate into a desire to constitute new states 
within former colonial confines”103. Colonies had been granted independence in their colonial 
boundaries, which had often been created by imperial powers without any regard for or input 
from the native populations. Claims of self-determination by many ethno-national groups 
within newly independent states, such as the Tamils in Sri Lanka, led to large-scale violence. 
However, the legal strength of territorial integrity of former colonies prevented these 
movements from gaining any legitimacy, even if they had obtained de facto statehood104. 
Fabry aptly summarizes the paradox of the simultaneous strengthening of the right to self-
determination and territorial integrity during decolonization: “as self-determination was 	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101 UN General Assembly. http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm 
102 Fabry, Recognizing States. 149. 
103 Fabry.163. 
104 A key example is the West’s response to the large-scale violence against the inhabitants of Biafra by the Nigerian 
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error and therefor the Nigerian government were right to resist it. See Fabry. 166. 
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authoritatively declared to be a universal right and an unprecedented number of states entered 
the society of states under its banner, the chances for future emergence of new states 
narrowed more than ever.”105 
 
Cassese has argued that the inclusion of the right to self-determination in both human rights 
covenants (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) in 1966 
broadened the scope of the right to beyond that of granting independence to colonial 
countries106. This was largely because of Western opposition to the inclusion of the right. 
One of their arguments against its inclusion played off Third World states’ fear of the fragile 
nature of their territorial integrity as a result of their ethnically diverse societies and argued 
that the right would also apply to peoples that were oppressed within sovereign states. 
Cassese summarizes this state of affairs as follows: “Ironically, however, it was the losing 
camp’s strategies which did the most to broaden the principle of self-determination. By 
endorsing the view that self-determination, if included in the Covenant, must not be limited 
to colonial situations, the West markedly contributed to the widening of the scope of the 
Article.”107 Their argument however did not broaden the principle of self-determination to 
legitimize minority claims to the right108, but rather introduced the idea of internal self-
determination to the concept. “Internal self-determiation is best explained as a manifestation 
of the totality of rights embodied in the [ICCPR]”109, or if we pay particular attention the 
rights embodied in the covenant it is the manifestation of a loose form of democracy. The 
self-determination promoted by Western states transformed the principle from a static right 
that could only be granted once to colonial territories or groups to a continuing right that 	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106 See Chapter 3, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. 
107 Cassese. 52. 
108 “An examination of the 1951 debates in the Third Committee and the 1952 discussions in the Commission of Human 
Rights makes it even more clear that the majority of States did not intend ‘peoples’ to encompass minorities”. Cassese. 62. 
109 Cassese. 52. 
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applied to individuals which could be continuously assessed by examining a state’s internal 
decision-making process. Thus, Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR included both 
external and internal concepts of self-determination. Up until the late 1980s however, the 
Human Rights Committee (the body responsible for the implementation of the ICCPR) gave 
more importance to the external component of the right, giving primacy to the principle of 
territorial integrity. A 1984 report emphasized that the promotion of self-determination “must 
be consistent with the States’ obligations under the Charter of the UN and under international 
law: in particular, States must refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other States 
and thereby adversely affecting the exercise of the right to self-determination”110. 
 
2.2 The story of Tamil nationalism: the entrance and rise of the demand for self-
determination. 
 
The thirty years following independence saw a rapid strengthening of Tamil “national 
awareness” to what Wilson calls a “national consciousness”111. From 1949 up until the l970s 
there was a consistent push for a federal government by the Federal Party (FP) led by S.J.V 
Chelvanayakam. These demands grew in strength in response to increasingly discriminatory 
policies by Sinhalese-dominated governments against Tamils and multiple failed attempts to 
reach a political settlement between the Tamils and Sinhalese. This period also saw the 
beginning of anti-Tamil riots and increasingly visible racist sentiments towards Tamil people. 
By the 1970s, youth in Jaffna, who were most affected by the policies, had begun to create 
militant revolutionary groups, having lost faith in the attempted political negotiations taking 
place in Colombo. Tamil politicians had also lost faith in the government’s ability to protect 
Tamil interests under a unified government and in 1976, the Tamil United Liberation Front 	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(TULF), a multi-party coalition, articulated the first demand for ‘Tamil Eelam’, an 
independent Tamil state. By the early 1980s, it was clear that militants controlled the demand 
for an independent state and in the late 1980s the LTTE emerged as the dominant Tamil 
militant group.  
 
GG Ponnambalam’s decision to form a coalition government with Senanayake’s U.N.P 
following the first post-independence election of 1948 and his subsequent complicity in the 
disenfranchisement of Indian Tamils led to a break in his relationship with S.J.V 
Chelvanayakam. Chelvanayakam left the ACTC in 1949 and created the FP. This marked the 
evolution of political demands associated with Tamil nationalism from balanced 
representation to a federal government. The FP had four consistent goals from 1949 up until 
the 1970s. The first was “a federal union of Ceylon, comprising the two Tamil-speaking 
Northern and Eastern Provinces, along with the remaining seven Sinhalese provinces.”112 The 
second was an end to state sponsored “colonization schemes” which Senanayake had started 
in the late 1940s. Sinhalese were resettled into traditionally Tamil areas and this resulted in 
“a decline in voting strength and a threat to what had hitherto been an unexpressed right of 
possession by Tamils of the Northern and Eastern provinces as their homelands”113. The third 
was the unity to all the Tamil-speaking peoples of Ceylon and the fourth was the equal status 
of Tamil and Sinhala as languages of the state.  
 
However, support from Tamil constituents for a federal government was not visible up until 
the 1956 general elections. In the 1952 general elections, the FP’s ability to only secure 2 of 
the 7 seats114 they contested suggests that Ceylon Tamils were ambivalent about the demand 
for a federal government to secure their interests, even after the implementation of the Indian 	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Citizenship Acts115. The FP were more successful in the 1956 elections in which S.W.R.D 
Bandaranaike won on a platform of ‘Sinhala only’ to capitalize on strong Buddhist nationalist 
sentiments. His bill made Sinhalese the primary language of the state rather than having both 
Tamil and Sinhalese replace English (which had previously been the plan). The ‘Sinhala 
Only’ Bill legitimized open race-hate and resulted in the first of many anti-Tamil riots116. It 
was in this political climate that the FP won 10 of the 14 seats that it contested in 1956. At 
this time the FP were representing all Tamils, including those outside the North and East and 
the “federal solution was a way of reconciling the claims of well-to-do Tamils in the seven 
Sinhalese provinces and the Ceylon Tamils living in their traditional homelands in the north 
and east”117. 
 
From 1956 up until the early 1970s, Tamils faced reduced employment opportunities due to 
the introduction of the ‘Sinhala only’ bill and discrimination in the recruitment process. 
Additionally, the state’s decision to nationalize schools resulted in a lack of investment to 
schools in Tamil-speaking regions. The Federal Party made two attempts to reach a political 
settlement to resolve the increasing tension between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. The first 
was the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact of 1957118 and the second was the Dudley 
Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pact of 1965119 however Buddhist nationalists in government 
heavily criticized both pacts and they were both abandoned. Throughout this period the FP 
maintained their demand for a federal government and the language used in their manifestos 
suggested that they viewed it as a way to realize the right to self-determination. Their 1960 
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manifesto, for example, stated, “If we are to preserve our identity and survive, we must 
preserve our language, our lands, our religions, our culture and our heritage. The one and 
only way… is to regain for us the right to be the rulers of ourselves in our own home. The 
only way to regain our right is to decide for ourselves our own destinies, without jeopardizing 
the unity of Ceylon, is the federal form of government.”120 Thus the FP was committed to 
realizing the right to self-determination under a unified Ceylon and in the 1970 elections they 
even urged “Tamil-speaking people not to lend their support to any political movement that 
advocates the bifurcation of the country”121.  
 
The situation for Tamils worsened considerably in the 1970s, mainly through the introduction 
of 1) discriminatory education policies and 2) the adoption of “an autochthonous republican 
constitution”122 which led to the demand for a federal government transforming into the 
demand for a separate state by the TULF in 1976. Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s government 
introduced an education policy in 1971 where admission of students was proportionate to the 
number of students who sat for university entrance examinations in that language and “for the 
first time, the integrity of university admissions policy was tampered with by using ethnicity 
as a basis”123. It was argued that the policy would correct the Tamil’s over-representation in 
education. Additionally, a district quota system was also introduced in 1973 and admissions 
to university were to be based on a quota determined by the population of the area. These 
policies had a dramatic effect on Tamil acceptances to university because their minority 
status (geographically and linguistically) meant that they had to obtain much higher marks. 
The 1972 constitution, which replaced the Soulbury constitution, added to Tamil anxieties – 
it was full of Buddhist nationalist undertones and there were no minority provisions. Chapter 	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II of the Constitution declared, “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the 
foremost place”124 and Section 29 of the former constitution was removed. Section 18 
provided a list of fundamental rights and freedoms however it also included a blanket clause 
that allowed the rights to “such restrictions as the law prescribes in the interests of national 
unity and integrity”125. Wilson, who was also Chelvanayakam’s son-in-law, reported that the 
FP was not consulted in the forming of the constitution and the demands that they made were 
“turned down by the Assembly even before being examined”126. The meeting of the 
Constituent Assembly on 22 May 1972 to pass the constitution was boycotted by fifteen of 
the nineteen Tamil representatives in Parliament. Chelvanayakam resigned his seat in 
parliament in 1972 as a result of the adoption of the new constitution. A by-election was not 
held for his seat until 1975 in which Chelvanayakam won his seat back “by the largest 
majority he had ever obtained since entering politics in 1947.”127 It was at his victory address 
that the demand for secession was first articulated: “I was to announce to my people and to 
the country that the Tamil Eelam nation should exercise the sovereignty already vested in the 
Tamil people and become free.” 128 One year later in 1976 the FP joined the multi-party 
Tamil United Front to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and the party 
declared, in what is also known as the Pannakam or Vaddukoddai resolution, “the restoration 
and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam based on 
the right of self-determination inherent in every nation has become inevitable in order to 
safeguard the very existence of the Tamil nation in this country.”129 From 1976 up until the 
end of the civil war, Tamil nationalism entailed the political demand for a separate state to 
realize the right to self-determination.  	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Following the Vaddukoddai resolution there were rapid transformations to the movement for 
an independent Tamil state. It moved from being fought through parliamentary politics by 
higher Vellala caste, often-Western educated elites to an armed struggle fought by youth who 
pre-dominantly came from a lower Karaiyar caste. 1983 was the beginning of the official 
armed conflict and by 1985 it “became clear that a peaceful settlement could not be reached 
without [Tamil militant’s] participation”130. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason for the 
rapid rate at which military groups took control of the demand of ‘Tamil Eelam’. Wilson has 
attributed some of this change to the loss of Chelvanayakam in 1977, commenting “his death 
marked an end of an era in Tamil politics. He was the cautionary voice, the safety valve that 
contained the emerging violence. His authority enabled him to chide the Tamil youth to desist 
from violence”131 The LTTE, which emerged in the late 1980s as the dominant militant 
group, after killing off or absorbing members of other insurgent groups, maintained that it 
was because many members of the Tamil community saw the taking up of arms as the only 
option left to them. A 1983 LTTE publication stated for example, “the Tamil people have 
taken up the armed struggle, as the only recourse left to win the freedom of the rights of the 
Tamil people on the basis of the right to self-determination”132.  
 
The disaffection of the Tamil population with the Sri Lankan government and parliament’s 
ability to bring about a solution that protected their interests is not an unreasonable 
explanation for the exponential rise in support for the LTTE in 1983. Government action 
before, during and after the state-sponsored pogrom of Tamils in 1983, also known as ‘Black 
July’, which killed thousands of Tamils and left tens of thousands of Tamils displaced, 	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resulted in a surge in support for Tamil militants. A few weeks before the event, President 
Jayawardene was quoted in the Daily Telegraph of 11 July 1983 as saying: “I am not worried 
about the opinion of the Tamil people… now we cannot think of them, not about their lives 
or their opinion ... Really if I starve the Tamils out, the Sinhala people will be happy”133. In 
response to the violence, the President appeared on television on 26 July 1983 and “did not 
utter a word of regret to the large number of Tamils who had suffered”, instead “assuaging 
the fears and hysteria of the Sinhalese people”134. As Wilson puts it, his “ultimate blunder” in 
his response to the violence, was his decision to make Tamil demands for the right to self-
determination illegal through the enactment of the Sixth Amendment to the constitution. The 
amendment titled “Prohibition against violation of territorial integrity of Sri Lanka” declared, 
“No person shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, 
finance, encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri 
Lanka”135. This amendment led to all 16 TULF representatives forfeiting their seats in 
Parliament, and the TULF did not return to parliamentary politics until the 1989 elections. 
From 1983, Tamil demands for self-determination was dominated by Tamil militants.  
 
It is not my intention here to narrate the full story of the Sri Lankan Civil War, which has 
been widely documented136. What is useful for my project is to make it clear that for the 
LTTE, the right to self-determination entailed nothing less than political independence. Their 
chief strategist, Anton Balasingham whilst examining the concept of self-determination 
lamented in 1983 that “The most ridiculous misrepresentation and misconceptualisation of 
this concept arises from a position in which the right of the Tamil nation to self-determination 
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is given recognition while opposing secession”.137 Additionally, for much of the 70s and 80s 
the LTTE’s demands for the right to self-determination were ideologically committed to 
Leninism. In their 1983 publication, a rare glimpse into the thinking of the LTTE, the 
struggle is framed as “revolutionary tasks of national emancipation and socialist revolution” 
in response to “the reality of national oppression, of the blatant violation of basic human 
rights, of racial crimes, of police and military violence, of attempted genocide” and also to 
“the worst form of capitalist exploitative machinery”138. Interestingly they legitimized their 
struggle by viewing the success of the TULF in the 1977 elections as “a plebiscite, a public 
expression of a nation’s will”139. 
 
2.3: Conclusion: Tamils mobilized around the language of self-determination after the 
right was perceived to have expired in Sri Lanka.  
 
‘Decolonization’ was a crucial time for both the right to self-determination and Tamil 
nationalism. The right to self determination entered the framework of international law 
through its inclusion in the UN Charter, signifying that the principle held a place in the new 
world order envisaged by the ‘Four Powers’. At this time, however self-determiation did not 
impose any immediate legal obligations on member states and was valued for being an 
“instrument of peace”140. Over the next couple of decades however Third World states 
successfully transformed it from being a means by which to achieve peaceful relations 
amongst existing states to a human right that colonial territories had been deprived of. The 
Bandung conference was instrumental for mobilizing Third World states’ position on self-
determination and it was described to have both intrinsic and instrumental value in the Final 
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Communiqué. An alliance between the Soviet Bloc and newly independent Third World 
states, which provided for a numerical advantage in the General assembly saw the principle, 
as envisaged by the Third World, achieve jus cogens status, through various UN Resolutions. 
The 1960 Declaration along with the subsequent 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, 
showed that territorial integrity and uti possidetis was fundamental to the idea of self-
determination and would be given primacy over other claims to self-determination. Thus as 
Cassese notes, self-determination was a right that expired once it had been exercised. Whilst 
the debates leading up to the adoption of self-determination in both human rights covenants 
suggested the inclusion of the idea of internal self-determination into the principle, this was 
not monitored or given primacy over territorial integrity by bodies such as the Human Rights 
Committee up until the end of the Cold War. Thus for much of this period, the granting of 
external self-determination did not depend on the internal character of a state.  
 
Alongside this, Tamil nationalism went through dramatic changes. Following independence, 
S.J.V Chelvanayakam first articulated the demand for self-determination in 1949, through the 
demand for a federal government. This demand did not gain traction amongst the Tamil 
electorate until 1956, following Bandaranaike’s infamous ‘Sinhala Only’ campaign. 
Discrimination in the employment sector, riots and increased racial tension sustained this 
demand for 2 decades. Whilst it was essentially a demand to “freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”141 it was not a 
demand for external self-determination, and emphasis was placed repeatedly on maintaining 
“the unity of Ceylon”142. After two decades of pushing for devolution of power without 
seeing any results, the introduction of discriminatory education policies that mostly affected 
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the politically isolated Tamil youth saw the creation of youth militant groups and the 
adoption of a constitution in 1972 that did not attempt to serve any of Tamil interests resulted 
in the multi-party TULF adopted a resolution that transformed the demand for a federal 
government into a demand for external self-determination in 1976. The next decade saw 
Tamil militants dominate the demand for self-determination and from 1983 to 1989 there 
were no TULF representatives in Parliament as a result of the adoption of the Sixth 
Amendment in 1983 which made Tamil demands for the right to self-determination illegal. 
The militant struggle was framed up until the late 1980s as a socialist revolution against both 
Sinhala chauvinism and capitalism.  
 
This period is perhaps the time when the mismatch between Tamil demands and what the 
international community was prepared to grant them was most clear. Tamil people started 
demanding the right to self-determination first as an autonomous federal government and 
then as secession when the right was perceived to have expired for the people of Ceylon (and 
later Sri Lanka) by the international community. When they articulated the demand for a 
federal government, it would not have been seen as an international issue because the right 
only referred to external self-determination.  The first time they seized the language of self-
determination was in 1976 when the TULF first articulated their demand for “the restoration 
and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam based on 
the right of self-determination inherent in every nation”143. By this time, debates leading up 
to the human rights covenants had revealed consensus around the idea that the right to self-
determination did not apply to minorities. The 1970 Declaration had made it clear that once a 
colony was granted independence it had “exercised their right of self-determination in 
accordance with the Charter” and Cassese has commented that it can be inferred from this 
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that, “if a people choose to associate or integrate with a sovereign country, it can 
subsequently only exercise the right to internal self-determination”144. From 1948, Sri Lanka 
was thought of as a post-colonial state where the colonial issue of external self-determiation 
had been solved. The internal character of the state and its treatment of its minority 
community did not give legitimacy to secession and it also did not delegitimize the 
sovereignty of the state.  
 
Once the right to self-determination had entered the framework of international law the 
interpretation of international lawyers mattered when deeming who was owed the right to 
self-determination and it seems apt here to quote the opinion of Hannum Hurst, a prominent 
international lawyer, on Tamil claims to the right to self-determination in 1990: “The more 
prosperous Tamil population refused to admit that it held a privileged position out of 
proportion to its numbers, and it did not seem to understand its delicate position as a minority 
in a country which itself felt threatened by the looming presence of India”145 and later “There 
will be no peace in Sri Lanka until the Tamil community recognizes that it is, in fact, a 
minority – and a rather small one at that.146 Despite the right to self-determination acquiring 
the status of a human right, during this period the idea of numbers distributing power and to 
some extent rights prevailed.  
 
Section 3: Post Cold War Era 
3.1 The story of self-determination: the universal entitlement to liberal democracy.  
 
The end of the Cold War was a pivotal moment in the history of human rights, as it signaled 
the triumph of certain characteristics of society that would determine the new global order. 	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This new global order had key implications for the way in which Third World sovereignty 
and the right to self-determination were understood by global powers. John Ikenberry has 
argued that the end of the Cold War signified the triumph of liberalism, over communism, as 
the dominant political ideology. It was when “the “inside” Western system became the 
“outside” order”147. Antony Anghie has argued that it “signified the triumph of capitalism 
and its decisive emergence as the one economic system that every society had to follow if it 
was to prosper and progress”148. The post-Cold War period is characterized by a US led 
project to universalize the liberal democratic state and it can be argued that this has 
predominantly been done through international human rights law. International human rights 
law, initially created in response to the savage actions of Hitler in Germany was transformed 
to combat ‘evil’ Third World states deemed to be savages not because of their barbaric 
actions against individuals but because these actions were a result of their illiberal ideologies. 
It is the paternalistic use of human rights law to intervene and ‘save’ sovereign states that led 
Anghie to conclude that the project of universalizing liberal democracies or what he terms 
“good governance” is simply a continuation of imperialism149. This agenda of bringing about 
a global liberal democratic order led to the weakening of the concept of sovereignty as 
territorial integrity and the transformation of self-determination from a collective right that 
applied to groups to an individual right to liberal democracy (which was what western states 
had promoted during the drafting of the human rights covenants. Additionally the use of force 
to achieve the right to external self-determination was deemed illegitimate.  
 
The term ‘liberalism’ can be applied to a variety of political ideologies that give weight to 
freedom and equality. The type of liberalism that was fiercely promoted by the US from the 	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1990s was characterized by emphasis on globalization, free markets, democracy, rule of law, 
and the promotion of human rights. Many of these characteristics, whilst hugely beneficial 
for US and European societies by giving them the ability to continue to trade and exercise 
influence in former colonies for example, have been found by many researchers to be 
detrimental for Third World development150 and have resulted in even more inequality 
between the First and Third Worlds. Nevertheless, through the seemingly universal language 
of human rights, the liberal democratic state has been promoted globally, especially to Third 
World states as a desirable state of affairs and a way by which Third World states can achieve 
development. As Anghie puts it, “attempts by Western states to promote ‘good governance’ 
in the Third World…are directed at reproducing in the Third World a set of principles and 
institutions which are seen as having been perfected in the West, and which the non-
European world must adopt if it is to make progress and achieve stability.”151  
 
When the Universal Declaration for Human Rights was adopted in 1948 it was not intended 
to be a liberal project152. In fact, when the human rights covenants were being drafted in the 
Third Committee, the US did not participate in related debates153 and Third World states 
played a significant role in their formation. This was because of their numerical advantage 
within the General Assembly, along with the fact that Western states viewed human rights 
debates issues as “superfluous to real international diplomacy”154. Anghie has noted how it 
had become increasingly clear to the Third World during this time that the international 
system that they had entered as sovereigns states did not reflect their interests and that the 	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new field of human rights law offered a way to produce a new international standard that the 
Third World could play a role in creating155. Thus emphasis was placed for the two decades 
of the human rights covenants on the right to self-determination and economic rights156. 
However, there was a shift in the human rights movement following the end of the Cold War 
- emphasis was placed more on protecting the individual rather than collective rights and on 
civil and political rights rather than economic and social rights157. The human rights project 
became a liberal project, and the necessary connection between liberalism and human rights 
is now supported by many human rights academics158. While some academics such as 
Samuel Moyn argue that this change occurred in response to newly independent states 
committing gross human rights violations with impunity within their sovereign territory159, 
there are others such as Anghie who argue that international human rights law, interpreted 
this way, offered Western powers a way to “regulate the behavior of a sovereign within its 
own territory”160 and was therefore employed to help provide the political institutions in 
Third World states required for a global liberal order that favored the West. 
 
Over the course of the 1990s obligations that international human rights imposed on states 
were reinterpreted so that it became necessary for the international community to regulate the 
internal political character of a state, such that “only liberal democracies are presumed 
capable of securing human rights, only they can count as partners in the new conversation of 	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International Law, 1st ed, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge, UK  ; New York: 
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international society”161. Thus the sovereignty that Third World had acquired through the 
promotion of the right to self-determination, went through radical changes and rather than 
guaranteeing their territorial integrity, became dependent on their ability to conform to 
Western expectations of what a state should look like. Two examples by which human rights 
has been employed to justify Western led intervention in Third World states are 1) the 
connection between human rights and development as argued for by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and 2) the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine.  
 
In his impressive book, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 
Anghie connects the contemporary human rights movement to the promotion of liberal 
democracies (what he calls “good governance”). He does this by outlining the link between 
human rights and development made by IFIs, such as the World Bank or the IMF (both 
founded in the post WWII period) which both provide crucial loans to Third World States. 
Their founding provisions prohibit them from interfering in the political affairs of a recipient. 
However, by arguing that only states that that respect human rights can achieve real 
development and that only a very specific type of liberal government can promote human 
rights they can “justify formulating an entirely new set of initiatives that seeks explicitly to 
reform the political institutions of a recipient state, on the basis that such reform is necessary 
to achieve development”.162 Failure of IFI policies to stimulate development is blamed on the 
lack of “good governance” rather than the policies themselves or the political systems they 
promote. The use of human rights to transform Third World states into what the First World 
has deemed universally virtuous is what led Makua Mutua to characterize the post Cold War 
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contemporary human rights movement using a “savage-victim-savior” metaphor163. He 
argues that this “three-dimensional prism” was intentionally constructed by “the main authors 
of the human rights discourse, including the United Nations, Western sates, international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs), and senior Western academics”164. The role of the 
‘savage’ is generally occupied the state that violates human rights. However it is not its role 
as a state that determines its status as a ‘savage’ but its “cultural deviation from human 
rights”165 by being an illiberal, anti-democratic or other authoritarian cultured state. The 
‘victim’ is “a powerless, helpless innocent whose naturalist attributes have been negated by 
the primitive and offensive actions of the state or the cultural foundation of the state”. Finally 
the ‘saviors’ are the authors of the human rights discourse, which Mutua argues is “ultimately 
a set of culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy”166. 
Thus “the metaphor is premised on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western 
cultures into a Eurocentric prototype and not the fashioning of a multicultural mosaic”167. 
 
The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine, adopted in 2005 is another way by which human 
rights has been used to redefine sovereignty. Used exclusively against Third World states168, 
it is a norm that legitimizes the use of force by Western states in Third World states, when 
human rights violations occur, for the purpose of saving a society from their savage illiberal 
leaders.  Chapter VII of the UN Charter gave exclusive responsibility to the Security Council, 
a purely political body, to authorize any use of force for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and Article 2.4 which whilst stressing the concept of territorial integrity 
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also included the provision that “this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter Vll”169. Thus from the conception of the United 
Nations, the importance given to national sovereignty was shaped by the Council’s discretion 
when deciding what constituted a threat to international peace and security. As mentioned in 
the previous section, territorial integrity of newly independent states was given extreme 
weight and up until the end of the Cold War, the Security Council did not view gross human 
rights violations as a threat to international peace and security, especially because the nature 
of conflict in the post war period tended to mean that conflict was confined within the 
boundaries of a sovereign state. Following the end of the Cold War, there was evidence of a 
change in the Council’s attitude to sovereignty in the face of human rights violations that was 
reluctantly accepted by China and Russia170. R2P, widely cited a success for its unanimous 
adoption at the UN World Summit in 2005171, is praised by many liberal western academics 
for changing the ethical discourse from “looking at the right of outsiders to intervene to right 
of civilians to have protection and be saved”.172 The norm gives the international community 
a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in 
accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”173. Thus it codified the 
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idea that conflict that was contained within the boundaries of a sovereign territory could 
constitute a threat to international peace and security.  
 
As the concept of territorial integrity within the right to self-determination weakened, more 
primacy was given to the conception of self-determination pushed for by Western states 
during the drafting of the human rights covenants. David Scott has argued that in the post 
Cold War period, the triumph of the Western ideology of liberal democracy meant that “a 
new norm of self-determination was asserting itself – a norm of self determination as 
democratic entitlement”174 The right to self determination in this period is no longer a claim 
to independence or external self-determination but a claim to internal self-determination, in 
particular “a claim about the universal entitlement to liberal democracy”175. In the post-Cold 
War era, many academics and jurists, (Scott uses Thomas Frank as an example) argue that the 
use of the word “all” in Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR which states, “All peoples have 
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”176 implies that it is 
a right that applies universally to all individuals to participate in a democratic process and 
should not be limited to decolonization. Thus, with the rise of the global liberal order that 
followed the end of the Cold War, self-determination has transformed from a being an 
external collective right to an internal individual one that applies to all people rather than just 
those under colonial rule. 
 
It is useful to draw upon the work of Robert Meister to examine how the new liberal world 
order and its reinterpretation of human rights impacted the legitimacy of liberation struggles 
which where being fought for the attainment of rights, like the one being fought by the LTTE 	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in Sri Lanka during this time period. In his book After Evil, Meister argues that the post-Cold 
War ‘Human Rights Discourse’177 views the revolutionary conception of human rights that 
dominated the period between 1789 and 1989 as evil. “Unlike previous conceptions of human 
rights that were a call to uprising and resistance, Human Rights Discourse operates today in 
the realm of intervention and rescue”178 Thus this new reformulation dramatically changed 
the situations in which the use of force was legitimate. “Large-scale violence was the ultimate 
evil”179 and thus force could only be legitimately used to rescue those who were suffering and 
this is what the R2P norm promotes by legitimizing humanitarian intervention. He adds 
“unilaterally bombing a civilian population of another country, for example, is no longer a 
prima facie war crime when it is done to stop a crime against humanity occurring on the 
ground”180. The use of force to fight for human rights, as was the nature of human rights 
advocacy prior to the end of the twentieth century was delegitimized. As Meister puts it “the 
revolutionary is no longer the standard paradigm of a militant for human rights; his 
willingness to inflict suffering on enemies raises too man questions about politically 
motivated cruelty.” Contemporary human rights discourse argues to have displaced politics 
with ethics and “the moral truth of human rights was often said to rest on a sympathetic 
identification with innocent victims on all sides that finally breaks the cycles of violence that 
revolutions too often produce.” 181 This was clear from an interview with James Ross, the 
legal and political director at Human Rights Watch. The organization does not take up the 
issue of statehood or the right to self-determination because they are political decisions and to 
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comment on the validity of a claim to statehood would violate their “principle of 
neutrality”182.  
 
Thus under the new liberal order, the human rights movement changed in order to place 
emphasis on rights that contributed to the creation of liberal democracies. The end goal of a 
liberal democracy resulted in the reformulation of self-determination, away from the 
decolonization interpretation of it as a group right to external self-determination to an 
individual right to democracy. Human rights organizations did not examine the legitimacy of 
claims to external self-determination in conflicts triggered by demands for secession. Those 
who used force to promote human rights, especially conceptions of human rights that no 
longer fitted with the new liberal order, such as the right to external self-determination were 
not seen as revolutionaries but as evil and the focus was placed on their means rather than 
their demands.  
 
3.2 The return of parliamentary politics, mass mobilization behind the LTTE and an 
attempt to liberalize the demand for Tamil Eelam.  
 
The demands associated with Tamil Nationalism did not change considerably throughout the 
civil war. In the post-Cold War era it continued predominantly as a military struggle led by 
the LTTE for the right to self-determination through secession up until the Sri Lankan Army 
ruthlessly eliminated them in 2009. There are a few features of the war that emerged in the 
post-Cold War era that are worth noting for my present project. The first was the re-
emergence of parliamentary politics with the return of TULF politicians into parliament in 
1989 and then the formation of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in 2001. These political 	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representatives alternated between promoting ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ forms of Tamil 
nationalism. Perhaps the most prominent ‘moderate’ attempt to resolve the war was Neelan 
Thiruchelvam’s ‘package’ of constitutional reform that was drafted in 1995 with President 
Chandrika Kumaratunga and involved devolving powers to the North and East. His push for a 
compromise that fell short of the demand for secession led to his brutal assassination in 1999 
by the LTTE183. Following opposition by Tamil and Sinhala nationalists the proposal was 
dropped. The TNA was an alliance between the TULF, the ACTC and political factions of 
Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation 
Organization (TELO)184 to contest the 2001 elections and they won the majority of seats in 
the North and East in the 2001 and 2004 election with a manifesto that endorsed the LTTE as 
the sole representative of the Tamil people185. However there were gaps between the TNA’s 
public commitments to Tamil constituents and their private statements to international actors 
where they would endorse more moderate stances on Tamil nationalism186. Thus it seems that 
despite promoting the idea of ‘Tamil Eelam’, it was a cultural rather than political concept for 
many TULF and TNA politicians.  
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Secondly, from 1990 up until the end of the war, the LTTE implemented a de facto state in 
various parts of Sri Lanka187. Madurika Rasaratnam writes of their de facto state that it was 
“a political project to give tangible form to the aspiration for national self-determination and 
sovereign nationhood”188. Additionally, there was evidence of significant mobilization behind 
the LTTE amongst Tamils, both in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora community. Rasaratnam 
argues that, “while coercion and violence were part of the LTTE’s repertoire, they existed 
alongside other and much more potent forms of mobilization and persuasion that secured and 
sustained its dominant position in Tamil politics”189. She cites their ability to disseminate 
information to the Tamil population through a variety of media which regularly reiterated 
their message of national liberation, their agenda of tackling issues relating to gender and 
caste, and their ability to manage post-disaster recovery following the 2004 tsunami as 
factors that contributed to this mass mobilization. The extremely high turnout190 at the 
‘Pongu Tamil’ (which translates to ‘Tamil Upsurge’) mass rallies, initiated in 2001 by Jaffna 
University students and other civil society activists to demand that the government 
reciprocate the LTTE’s unilateral ceasefire, suggests that there was significant support for the 
LTTE. The LTTE would get involved with the organization of following rallies, along with 
societal groups such as trader associations, teachers’ unions, fishermen’s societies and 
churches. This along with the success of the TNA in elections which explicitly endorsed the 
LTTE and the principle of territorial nationhood to achieve the right to self-determination 
suggest that there was significant support for the LTTE by the Tamil community in the post 
Cold War period.  
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Finally, following the end of the Cold War the LTTE and other Tamil groups that were 
supportive of the demand for an independent ‘Tamil Eelam’ started to formulate their 
demands for Tamil Eelam in a way that attempted to make it compatible with the new liberal 
world order. Prabhakaran’s annual ‘Heroes day’ speech “drew directly on liberal 
principles”191 and would invoke Tamil people’s rights to freedom and dignity and describe 
the Tamil struggle as a response to Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism that sought to “repress and 
subjugate our people”. His 1993 speech stated, “We are standing on a strong moral 
foundation. We are fighting for a just cause. Our political objectives conform with 
international norms and principles.” His 1996 speech emphasized that the LTTE wanted “an 
authentic peace, a true, honorable permanent peace” and had not yet been granted an 
adequate opportunity to bring it about192.  His 1998 speech lamented, “the countries which 
lead the civilized world are reluctant to raise their voices against the uncivilized forms of 
oppression unleashed against the Tamils”193. A brief submitted by the Tamil Information 
Centre (a London based human rights NGO that was sympathetic to the LTTE) to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 1994, also showed extreme awareness of the triumph of 
liberal democracy194 in the international political arena and democracy was incorporated into 
Tamil demands: “The Tamil people believe that any permanent political solution to the ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka, has to take into consideration the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil-
speaking people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural destiny, in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Rasaratnam, Tamils and the Nation India and Sri Lanka Compared. 189. 
192 Velupillai Prabhakaran, “Maha Veerar Naal Address, மாவீரர் நாள் 1996,” Tamil Nation, November 27, 1996, 
http://tamilnation.co/ltte/vp/mahaveerar/vp96.htm. 
193 Velupillai Prabhakaran, “Maha Veerar Naal Address, மாவீரர் நாள் 1998,” Tamil Nation, November 27, 1998, 
http://tamilnation.co/ltte/vp/mahaveerar/vp98.htm. 
194 The Tamil Information Centre acknowledge that “there is growing opinion that the international community should pay 
less heed to the traditional principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention and more to the violation of 
human rights, and the prevention, management and resolution of protracted and violent ethnic conflicts, in particular, to 
those which are the result of denials of claims to the right to self- determination.” Tamil Information Centre, “Briefing to 
Participants of the UN Commission on Human Rights: The Right to Self-Determination, the Sri Lankan Tamil National 
Question,” 1994, http://tamilnation.co/selfdetermination/tamileelam/94tic.pdf. 
	   54 
democratic fashion.”195 Nevertheless these attempts were quite weak when compared to the 
Sri Lankan state’s attempts to control the narrative of the war. 
 
3.3 Conclusion: A militant liberation struggle for Tamil Eelam was incompatible with 
the goals of the new global liberal democratic order. 
 
In the post Cold War era, the LTTE were demanding a conception of the right to self-
determination that no longer existed, according to the international community, by 
demanding an independent ‘Tamil Eelam’ and the means by which they were trying to 
achieve it had been deemed an illegitimate use of force. The goal of universalizing liberal 
democracies had impacted the West’s attitude to conflict resolution. Conflict resolution did 
not focus on addressing the grievances that caused conflict but instead prioritized the 
securing of a lasting and liberal peace through the transformation of conflict-ridden societies 
into liberal market democracies196. Under the new liberal global order it looked as if the 
LTTE was clinging on to an outdated understanding of human rights, one where the right to 
self-determination entailed sovereignty and one in which the use of force in revolutions 
aimed at securing human rights was legitimate. This was no longer the case and their militant 
tactics presented an obstacle to the creation of a stable liberal democracy. Additionally, the 
narrative pushed by the Sri Lankan government and the existence of ‘moderate’ Tamils 
resulted in the dismissal of mass mobilization behind the LTTE and they were viewed as the 
only obstacle to stability in the region. Thus, due to the redefining of sovereignty during this 
time, the LTTE were not seen by the West as a liberation movement but as a threat to 
international peace and security.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Tamil Information Centre. 4. 
196 For an examination of conflict resolution through democratization and marketization see Mark R. Duffield, Global 
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The priorities of the post Cold War liberal order resulted in a mismatch between the narrative 
of the war promoted by the LTTE (and many members of Tamil society) and the narrative 
accepted by Western states, which was the narrative heavily promoted by the Sinhala state. 
For the LTTE, the demand for Tamil Eelam, was a “civilized political demand” that was met 
with “a savage form of military repression”197 by the chauvinist Sri Lankan state, thus the 
LTTE’s movement was a legitimate liberation movement. The Sinhala state’s narrative of the 
war can be mapped onto Matua’s Savage-Victim-Savior metaphor. The LTTE were portrayed 
as the savage terrorists, the Sinhala state and Tamil civilians as victims of terrorism. The state 
in this case were not the savages and positioned themselves as victims who were committed 
to neo-liberal reforms and the West and the international community were positioned as the 
saviors who could, through military support and aid help eliminate the scourge of terrorism. 
The West was most receptive to the Sri Lankan government’s narrative and this is perhaps 
because the Sri Lankan state’s positioning of LTTE as terrorists that posed the primary 
obstacle to liberal progress meant that their goals were aligned.  
 
The West adopted the Sri Lankan state’s narrative of the LTTE being terrorists and in 1997 
the US banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization, and the UK did the same in 2001. The 
use of the term “terrorist” to describe the LTTE was significant because “the label of 
terrorism separated Tamil militancy from its origins in the contestation of between Sinhala 
and Tamil nationalist projects, and transferred it, shorn of political content to an international 
plane of opprobrium and illegitimacy, where it added urgency to the military support 
extended to Sri Lanka in securing stability and peace”198. The goal for the West was to 
contain and/ or eliminate the LTTE rather than address the oppression and Sinhala 	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nationalism that had led to the war in the first place199. The idea that the ‘Tamil problem’ 
would be resolved with the elimination of the LTTE, was evident in a 2006 statement made 
by the US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns: “in the case of Sri Lanka…we support 
the government. We have a good relationship with the government. We believe the 
government has a right to try and protect the territorial integrity of the country. The 
government has a right to protect the stability and security in the country.” Of the LTTE he 
stated “We also believe that the Tamil Tigers, the LTTE, is a terrorist group responsible for 
massive bloodshed in the country and we hold the Tamil Tigers responsible for much of what 
has gone wrong in the country. We are not neutral in this respect”200 
 
It seemed that dismissal of the demands of the LTTE and their means resulted in dismissal of 
the problem of oppression all together. There was no real effort by the international 
community to address the Tamil grievances that had caused the war, the priority was to 
endorse or promote solutions that would end the militant conflict as quickly as possible in 
order to bring about a stable peace. The mass mobilization of Tamils behind the LTTE (such 
as the ‘Pongu Tamil’ rallies which would see turnouts of hundreds of thousands of people) 
was largely ignored or dismissed as inauthentic. Rasaratnam comments, “although organized 
and widely understood by participants as demonstrations to the international community of 
popular Tamil sentiment, and despite their growing scale and political significance, the rallies 
were derided and dismissed by international actors and Sri Lankan officials as being 
coercively engineered by the LTTE and not an authentic expression of Tamil sentiment”201. 
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Additionally, the consistent opposition by Sinhalese nationalists to all the political solutions 
that were presented, including to Neelan Thiruchelvam’s package of devolution was largely 
ignored by the international community and was not viewed as a threat to the liberal 
progression of Sri Lanka202. Rasaratnam has attributed the inability of the international 
community to see the incompatibility of forming a liberal democracy in a country with strong 
Sinhala nationalist and Tamil nationalist sentiments to the existence of elite ‘moderate’ 
politicians. She argues that “the intensity of Sinhala nationalist mobilization against the peace 
process, the notion of power-sharing, and international liberal peace actors did not undermine 
international confidence in the possibility of externally-assisted, state-led liberal reform or its 
efficacy in addressing Tamil ‘grievances’. This was in great part because the international 
community could always find Sinhala and Tamil political elites who were willing both to 
engage in the modalities of liberal peace-building, deploying the ethnically neutral discourses 
of liberalism, democracy and development, and to reassure the international community of a 




The project of this thesis was to evaluate the compatibility between political demands 
associated with Tamil nationalism over the 20th century and what the international 
community was prepared to grant the Sri Lankan Tamil community. It was motivated by the 
desire to understand why the LTTE throughout the course of Sri Lankan civil war were 
demonized and stereotyped as terrorists, and why their political demands for the right to self-
determination were stripped of legitimacy despite mobilizing the language of international 
human rights and having the support of many Tamil people in Sri Lanka and the diaspora. In 	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order to understand the specificity of their demands it was necessary to look at the history of 
Tamil nationalism. Alongside this story, I decided to examine the contiguous story of the 
right to self-determination, and the way those with the power to grant it, the West, had 
interpreted it. The research conducted to understand this story helped me grasp what the 
international community felt minority groups within colonies and later former colonies were 
entitled to when it came to self-government and the right to self-determination. By dividing 
the 20th century into three different time periods and examining these two stories 
simultaneously I have been able to conclude that throughout the 20th century and early 21st 
century, the demands associated with Tamil nationalism have always been incompatible with 
what the West was prepared to grant.  
 
Tamil nationalism acquired a political character in the early 20th century after the island’s 
colonizers, the British, decided to replace communal representation with territorial 
representation in response to demands by both Tamil and Sinhalese political representatives 
for increased self-government. This change in representation threatened the political equality 
that Tamil people had maintained with the Sinhalese population for centuries, but the British 
Commissioners who formed the Donoughmore constitution did not give weight to concerns 
relating to Sinhalese majoritarianism. For them, self-government necessarily entailed a liberal 
democracy and its success depended on fostering a democratic ethos, which in turn required 
an all-Ceylon national unity. Universal suffrage and territorial representation was employed 
as a tactic to foster this unity, and communal politics was seen as an obstacle to this end. The 
Report of the Donoughmore Commission, along with influential historical analysis, show that 
it seemed self-evident and progressive at this time for political power to be in the hands of the 
majority. Thus Tamil concerns about the dominance of the Sinhalese population and the 
desire to reorganize power to prevent this was perceived as illiberal, and it looked as if they 
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were asking for more than they deserved. It was incompatible with Britain’s vision of a 
liberal democracy for their colony.  
 
During the period that I have labeled decolonization, the idea that “All peoples have the right 
to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”204 acquired the peremptory 
status of jus cogens. However, despite its universal language it was clear that the right to 
external self-determination belonged only to colonial territories. The simultaneous 
strengthening of the concept of territorial integrity and uti possidetis meant that the right 
could only be applied once to colonial territories and expired once these territories obtained 
independence. Tamil nationalism however strengthened and mobilized around the language 
of self-determination after Ceylon had been granted independence in 1948, in response to 
increasing discrimination and oppression by the Sinhalese state and the repeated failure of 
parliamentary politics to address Tamil grievances. By the time they articulated the demand 
for external self-determination in 1976, Sri Lanka was perceived to be a post-colonial state in 
which the right to self-determination had been realized. Within this independent state, 
minority communities like the Tamil community were not entitled to self-determination, as it 
would violate the territorial integrity of the state. Their demands were incompatible with the 
international community’s assumption of who the ‘people’ entitled to self-determination 
were, and this was partially because of the continued belief that power should be distributed 
by numbers.  
 
Finally, in the post-Cold War era, the LTTE maintained their militant struggle for an 
independent Tamil Eelam. They continued to mobilize the language of self-determination 
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that had legitimized the anti-colonial revolutionary struggles during the decolonization 
period. However, the global world order had changed significantly following the end of the 
Cold War. The reinterpretation of human rights within this Western-led liberal order resulted 
in the LTTE and their political demands being delegitimized. In this new order, the human 
rights that were promoted were the ones that contributed to the creation of a liberal 
democracy, and the right to self-determination was reformulated to mean every individual’s 
universal entitlement to liberal democracy. The LTTE’s demands for Tamil Eelam were 
stripped of political content because the demand for external self-determination was no 
longer a legitimate demand in the new liberal order, and the means they used to obtain it had 
been deemed evil. Force could now only be legitimately used by the West to save victims. 
The West could also legitimize their rejection of the demand for Tamil Eelam by adopting the 
Sri Lankan state’s narrative that the LTTE were a terrorist organization and the sole obstacle 
to liberal progress, with no support from the majority of the Tamil population. This narrative 
was further legitimized by the existence of moderate Tamil politicians who reassured the 
international community that the majority of the Tamil community desired a political 
compromise. Thus, in the post-Cold War era both the LTTE’s demands and means were 
incompatible with the goals of the new liberal world order, which placed emphasis on the 
creation of stable liberal democracies within existing boundaries. This incompatibility is 
clearly visible in a 2001 statement made by American Ambassador E. Ashley Wills: “The 
heroes of the coming months will be those who advocate tolerance, not violence, those who 
see the need for compromise and moderation rather than those who wish to push ahead 
toward unattainable visions of separation and exclusivity.”205 
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Looking at the story of Tamil nationalism and the story of self-determination side-by-side, it 
is fair to conclude that there has never been a point in time during the 20th century where the 
political demands associated with Tamil nationalism have coincided with what the West (or 
those with the power to grant Tamil people their demands) have felt they are entitled to. A 
key reason for this was the seemingly self-evident belief that numbers were the legitimate 
way to distribute power within a territory whose borders had been decided by colonial 
powers. Despite the right to self-determination (the right that the LTTE mobilized their 
struggle around) obtaining jus cogens status in the 1960s, it wasn’t able to legitimize their 
demand for Tamil Eelam because the concept of uti possidetis and the virtue of a liberal 
democracy prevailed. From the moment that Tamils accepted the framework of democracy 
and articulated their demands within it they committed themselves to the status of a minority 
community. Minority communities were not eligible to the right to self-determination and 
therefore it was inevitable in the late 20th and early 21st century that the demand for Tamil 
Eelam (first articulated in 1976 after Tamils had accepted the rationality of democracy) 
would only ever be a dream.  
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